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The Scope of Judicial Review: A Continuing

Dialogue
RAouL BERGER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In marked contrast to the splenetic reception given by some
academicians to my study of the fourteenth amendment,I Professor Randall Bridwell joins the select circle of those who seek to
weigh my evidence dispassionately. 2 His analysis of deficient rationalizations for judicial activism sweeps aside some cluttering
analytical debris and underscores the failure to "address the issue
of majority rule" that is central to our democratic system.3 With
him I consider that activist argumentation is largely "a simple
statement of desired results," and is "plagued by formidable
problems." 4 His rejection, for example, of the view that
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, 1962-65; Charles Warren
Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University, 1971-76. A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1938, Harvard Uniiersity;
LL.D. 1978, University of Michigan.
1. R. BERGER, GovERNmENT By JuDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMNDmENT (1977). See, e.g., Brest, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, §6, at 10,
col. 3; Miller, Book Review, Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1977, §E, at 5, col. 1; Murphy,
Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1752 (1978).
2. Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907 [hereinafter cited as Bridwell I];
Bridwell, The FederalJudiciary:America's Recently Liberated Minority, 30 S.C.L. REv.
467 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bridwell H]. See, e.g., Kay, Book Review, 10 CoNN. L.
REv. 801 (1978); Kommers, Book Review, 40 THE REvMW OF PoLrcs 409 (1978); Perry,
Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1978).
3. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 474.
4. Id. at 472-73, 474. I agree that "a jargonized result-6riented dialogue" has "largely
replaced the analytical device of separating principles from results." Id. at 473.
Among the arguments Bridwell rejects are: (1) those structured around the horrible
results that allegedly will occur without expansive judicial review, id. at 473, overlooking
that judicial review was not designed as a cure-all; (2) the argument that the Court
became "a super-legislator because our democratic institutions have allegedly failed," id.
at 472 n.12, and see id. at 475 n.20, as if legislative power is transferred to the Court when
Congress fails to exercise it; and (3) demagogic appeals for "support of a majority of a
relatively small, but possibly influential, component of the legal community-legal schol-
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"unlimited minority vindication is.

of constitutional

law,"'

.

[Vol. 31

. the fundamental axiom

seems tQ me markedly to advance analy-

sis.

Nevertheless, in essence he concludes with "a plague on both
your houses." Thus, he finds my approach also has "serious and
obvious limitations," ' and places me at the other "extreme,"
ruled by a "preoccupation with rendering one component in the
overall process of constitutional interpretation-such as the
framers' intent-into a hypertechnical and possibly exclusive
guide to constitutional law." 7 This results from a misapprehension of my very narrow focus. The core of my thesis is set
forth at the very outset of my book: the framers of the fourteenth amendment unmistakably intended to exclude suffrage
(and segregation) from its scope,' a view that Bridwell accepts.'
Consequently, the "one person-one vote" (and desegregation)
decisions represent a judicial rejection of the framers' choices,
a judicial revision that squarely contradicts their intention.
Bridwell recognizes that the claim of "power to ignore clearly
expressed intent on a particular issue clearly seems to be harder
to justify than all other claims for judicial authority";' 0 that is
the only claim I considered. He believes that "the Court cannot
choose 'fundamental values' for the society,"" precisely my
position. Had Bridwell dwelt on the materials which I collected
in support of this position, he would have helped to clarify the
most important aspect of the ongoing debate.
Instead he sought for broader theories than I espoused,
thereby distracting attention from the arrogation that is "harder
ars-around particular policies that emerge from current judicial decisions," id. at 474.
Compare id. with Brest, supra note 1.
5. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 477.
6. Id. at 481.
7. Id. at 476.
8. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 7-8.
9. See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
10. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 919. He also states that my "attempt to link judicial
action to at least some limiting constitutional principle is more satisfying than the appeal
to self-evident principles of 'justice' and 'equality' or the total result-orientation of some
who simply wish to avoid the whole issue." Id. at 918.
11. Id. at 920 n.60. Defending the Warren Court, Judge J. Skelly Wright declared,
"the most important value choices have already been made by the framers of the Constitution." Judicial "value choices . . . are to be made only within the parameters" of those
choices. Quoted in R. BERoER, supra note 1, at 322. Instead of citing to the sources, I shall
throughout cite to the pages of my book where they are cited or quoted, both in the interest
of space conservation and of directing attention to confirmatory materials there set out.
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to justify than all other claims for judicial authority.' 1 2 It follows
that a considerable number of Bridwell's objections to my study
are beside the point because they arraign me for what I never
attempted. 3 Nor did I overlook (what Bridwell regards as a
"serious and obvious limitation") that "constitutional provisions
exist on a spectrum ranging from the relatively specific to the
extremely open-textured"; 4 instead I picked a point on that
"spectrum," not one for which the legislative history "has serious

shortcomings" or "really is not clear,"' 5 but one for which Bridwell himself finds the record "clearly convincing."' In fact, I
expressly disclaimed any purpose to deal with "the interpretation
of amorphous constitutional provisions such as 'commerce,'
which, unlike 'due process,' have no historical content." 7 Appealing to William Crosskey, Bridwell doubts whether "commerce"
can be regarded as amorphous. 8 Be it so; any other example of
an "amorphous" provision will equally fit my disclaimer. To take
the other branch of his reservation, that "in many cases" resort
to evidence of "intent" "has serious shortcomings," I expressly
disclaimed consideration of the "weight to be accorded
'enigmatic' history."' 9 Because inconclusive evidence of intention
12. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 919.
13. Thus he is "troubled by [my] failure to develop fully a basic theory of constitutional interpretation which would support [my] general charges of judicial usurpation."
Id. at 912. I made no "general charges of judicial usurpation," id. (emphasis added), but
confined myself to several usurpations under the fourteenth amendment. My purpose
required no screening of "the various methods by which the intent may be revealed," id.
at 913-14 n.32, for that intent shines forth from the pages of the debates in the 39th
Congress. Nor did I "assume that the Constitutionhas a limited meaning and is addressed
to particular problems," Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 481 (emphasis added), but limited
myself to the framers' exclusion of suffrage and segregation from, and non-incorporation
of the Bill of Rights in, the fourteenth amendment, a far smaller focus. Neither did I assert
that "the framers' intent is a. . .generally applicable method of keeping faith with the
" id., but only that the unmistakable intention must govern, see id. at
Constitution ...
468 n.2.
14. Bridwell 11, supra note 2, at 481 (quoting Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism:Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 413 (1978)).
15. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 481-82.
16. See text accompanying note 21 infra.
17. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 284.
18. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 914 n.36. Professor Ernest Brown, who was severely
critical of Crosskey, pointed out that he substituted for the predominant
usage-"exchange of merchandise"-the more comprehensive "general regulation of
trade." Brown, Book Review, 67 I-HRv. L. REv. 1439, 1448, 1452 (1954). Even so read,
"commerce" is still amorphous when compared with the historical procedural content of
due process of law. See text accompanying notes 70-75 infra.
19. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 284.
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is an inadequate guide to the meaning of an enactment, it does
not follow that effect should be. denied to the readily ascertainable, unmistakable intention of the framers. Whatever "the limitations of express intention" in the former category, they cannot
vindicate "the particular cases which Berger seeks to discredit,"
i.e., where the framers' intention to exclude suffrage and segregation is unmistakable." My comments on such misunderstandings
are offered in no captious spirit but rather to narrow the issues,
dispel possible confusion, and to impel Bridwell to evaluate a
number of important points on which he did not dwell.
On the threshold issue, Bridwell concludes that "[c]ertainly
Berger convincingly argues [on the basis of numerous unequivocal statements by the framers] that the fourteenth amendment
was crystal clear with regard to suffrage and segregation in public
schools," 2' a conclusion shared by a growing number of academicians, including activists.22 Then too, given that the framers re20. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 915. Bridwell therefore errs in charging me with
"overgeneralizing the principles of interpretation [Berger] employs to attack the Warren
Court's desegregation and reapportionment decisions .

. . ."

Id.

21. Id. at 913. For present purposes Bridwell's analysis of the weight to be accorded
various types of legislative comments, id. n.32, is over-refined and redundant. For he
concludes, "the negative statements on suffrage and segregation were made so often, by
so many, and most often by congressional leaders charged with explaining the amendment," id. (to which may be added the unanimous report by the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction), that "on these two points alone . . . Berger is correct," id. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has held that "[tihe opinions of some members of the Senate, conflicting with the explicit statements of the meaning of the statutory language made by
the Committee reports and members of the Committees on the floor . . . are not to be
taken as persuasive of the Congressional purpose." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy
Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942). In other words, the Court relies on reports and statements
by members of the committee (which studied the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment).
Bridwell notices the argument that the understanding of the framers "did not carry
over into the state ratification process." Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 913 n.32. The framers,
however, were the delegates of the people and expressed their sentiments. Morton Keller
noted that the "off-year elections of 1867," during which ratification of the amendment
was debated, "made clear the popular hostility to black suffrage in the North." William
Gillette observed that "[m]ost Congressmen apparently did not intend to risk drowning
by swimming against the treacherous current of racial prejudice and opposition to Negro
suffrage"; "white Americans resented and resisted" it; and "Negro voting in the North
was out of the question." W. GnLETrs, TH RIorr TO VOTE: POLmCS AND THE PASSAGE OF
THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT, 25, 27, 32 (1969). Such facts repel an assumption that the
ratifiers read suffrage into the amendment; the rational inference, rather, is that the
framers spoke for the people. A reconstruction historian, Phillip Paludan, concluded that
the fourteenth amendment "was presented to the people as leaving control of suffrage in
State hands." Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 155.
22. Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and ConstitutionalChange: Another Look at
the "OriginalIntent" Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,5 HASTnGS CONST. L.Q.
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jected suffrage and desegregation, it is altogether unlikely that
they meant to surrender traditional state control over their own
criminal administration by allegedly embodying the Bill of
Rights in the amendment. Even if the terms of the amendment
be regarded as "general"-an assumption rebutted by the
facts-the tenth amendment reservation to the states of all powers not delegated calls for a showing that so massive a transfer
was contemplated, 23 a showing, Charles Fairman demonstrated in
1949, that cannot be made, 2' as my own study confirms. 25
True it is that I only made "a damning case against a small
number of particular decisons, ' ' 21 but consider what these cases
are. The desegregation and criminal administration cases have
given rise to some of the most divisive issues that confront the
nation. 2 As said by Professor Philip Kurland, "the usurpation by
the judiciary of general governmental power on the pretext that
its authority derives from the fourteenth amendment" presents
"the most immediate constitutional crisis of our times."r2 Moreover, these few "particular decisions" probably constitute the
largest source of the Court's business 29 and furnish the chief
fulcrum for control of controversial policies which the framers
left to the states. If, therefore, my analysis is valid, it serves as a
plea to the jurisdiction which can remove such rancorous issues
as busing, affirmative action, abortion, death penalties, control
of state criminal law administration and the like from the federal
courts. That seems to me of far greater practical importance than
603, 606-07 (1978); Lusky, "Government by Judiciary". What Price Legitimacy, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979); Beloff, Book Review, London Times, April 7,

1978, Higher Educ. Supp., at II; Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TxAS L. Rnv. 579, 581
(1978).
23. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967), the Court declined to read "any
person" to include judges in the absence of a specific provision abolishing their commonlaw immunity.
24. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
25. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 134-56. See also Alfange, supra note 22, at 607; Perry,
supra note 2, at 687-88.
26. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 914 n.32.
27. In Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2990 (1979), Justice Powell,
dissenting, adverted to the "resentment against judicial coercion" occasioned by the
Court's busing decrees. William Brashler recently wrote that the "schism between white
and black America is still painfully present, and appears all but irreparable ..
N.Y.
Times, Dec. 3, 1978, §6 (Magazine), at 34, 36.
28. Letter from Philip Kurland to Harvard University Press (August 15, 1977).
29. Frankfurter, John Marshalland the JudicialFunction, 69 HAnv. L. Rav. 217, 229

(1955).
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to come forth with a unified field theory of judicial review and
constitutional interpretation. Better to deal, as is the commonlaw tradition, with the particular situation presented by the fourteenth amendment, as to which plentiful clear evidence exists,
and to clarify the issues thereby presented, leaving broader generalizing to the future and to others.
At the outset it needs to be emphasized that advocacy of
judicial activism is a product of the very recent past, representing
an attempt to rationalize judicial effectuation of the aspirations
of an intellectual elite." As one activist, Professor Alfred Kelly,
complacently observed, the Warren Court "was determined to
carry through a constitutional egalitarian revolution." 1 A fellow
activist, Professor Louis Lusky, forthrightly stated that the Court
has "a new and grander conception of its own place in the governmental scheme," resting on "two basic shifts in its approach to
constitutional adjudication": "assertion of power to revise the
Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure
prescribed by Article V," and "repudiation of the limits on judicial review that are implicit in the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison."3 2 With Hamilton, I hold that "an agent cannot new model

his own commission," 33 a matter to which I shall return. The
transition to the "new and grander conception" is thus described
by another Warren enthusiast-Professor Stanley Kutler:
"through the late 1930s, academic and liberal commentators...
criticized vigorously the abusive power of the federal judiciary
* ..
[for] frustrating desirable social policies . . . [for] arrogat[ing] a policymaking function not conferred upon them
by the Constitution." 4 It was after 1937, he continues, that "most
of the judiciary's longtime critics suddenly found a new faith...
[they] matched a new libertarianism that promoted 'preferred
freedoms' . . . with an activist judiciary to protect those values. ' 35 What Bridwell describes as my "interesting minority posi30. See text accompanying note 168 infra.
31. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119, 158.
32. Lusky, supra note 22, at 406 (emphasis added).
33. A. HAMILTON, Letters of Camillus, in 6 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, WORKS 166 (H.
Lodge ed. 1904). Madison stated in the convention that "it would be a novel & dangerous
doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence." 2 M. FARRAND, REcoRDs OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 92-93 (1913). See
also note 143 infra.
34. Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth:A History or Ahistorical, 6 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 511, 512 (1979) (emphasis added).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
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tion"35 is therefore far more deeply-rooted than the currently fashionable activism. It is derived, in the words of Professor Thomas
Grey, from a long tradition "of great power and compelling simplicity. . . deeply rooted in our history and in our shared principles of political legitimacy. It has equally deep roots in our formal
constitutional law . . .,.
Before passing on to more general considerations, I shall discuss two particulars. As I wrote earlier, one cannot speak of minority rights en gros;35 the Constitution did not create, to borrow
Bridwell's words, a "roving judicial commission to protect minorities against majorities in all cases." 9 "[W]ithin the State itself," Gouverneur Morris, a defender of the propertied minority,
said in the Convention, "a majority must rule, whatever may be
the mischief done among themselves."40 The 1787 Constitution
largely defined a structure of government, delineating its powers;
such individual rights as it granted dealt with security of property, commerce, and contracts. Broader individual rights are first
found in the subsequent Bill of Rights, designed to protect all of
the people against a remote and suspect federal government, in
great part to secure established criminal procedures in federal
prosecutions." The matter has been well summarized by Professor Louis Henkin:
36., Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 480. Bridwell correctly notes that "the academic
community has clearly leaned toward a form of utilitarian policy analysis generally favoring judicial activism." Id. at 474.
37. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN.L. REV. 703, 705 (1975).
"All questions of constitutional construction," Justice Horace Gray stated, are "largely a
historical question." Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 169 (1895) (dissenting opinion).
Jacobus tenBroek acknowledged that the Court "has insisted, with almost uninterrupted
regularity, that the end and object of constitutional construction is the discovery of the
intention of those persons who formulated the instrument. . .

."

tenBroek, Use by the

United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in ConstitutionalConstruction: The Intent Theory of ConstitutionalConstruction, 27 CALIn. L. Rav. 399, 399 (1939).
38. Berger, The FourteenthAmendment: The Framers'Design, 30 S.C.L. REv. 495,
501 (1979).
39. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 475.
40. Berger, supra note 38, at 501 (quoting 2 M. FAIRAND, REcoRDs OF TiE FEDERAL
CoNvEIM ON OF 1787, at 439 (1911)). "[R]ule in accord with the consent of a majority of
the governed is-the core of the American governmental system." Ely, Constitutional
Interpretivism:Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 411 (1978).
41. See Berger, supra note 38, at 502. In "the minds of most Whigs in 1776 individual
rights, even the basic civil liberties that we consider so crucial, possessed little of their
modern theoretical relevance when set against the will of the people." G. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF Tm AMERIcAN REPUnLIC 1776-1787, at 63 (1969). Wood adds, "[i]t
was conceivable to protect the common law liberties of the people against their rulers, but hardly
against the people themselves." Id.
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[Iln largest part the Constitution is not a charter of liberties
but a blueprint for a federal system of government. . . .The
original Constitution contained a few express limitations and
prohibitions on the national government, most of them (in Art.
I, sec. 9) to protect state interests (rather than individual freedom). . . .There are some safeguards for individual rights in
the original Constitution, for example provisions for requiring a
jury trial in criminal cases (Art. 1IH, sec. 2), and prescribing
requirements for conviction for treason (Art. IU, sec. 3). The
principal limitations in favor of the individual are in the Bill of
Rights . . .and those imposed on the States in . . .the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.2

The majority, Bridwell justly concludes, did not "destroy themselves by forever disabling them from taking a position contrary
to any minority interest."4 In short, minority rights must be derived from some provision of the Constitution, and I shall hereinafter show that the fourteenth amendment did not create a
charter of unlimited minority rights.
Bridwell also punctures activist insistence that canons of
statutory construction are inapplicable to constitutional interpretation: the argument amounts "to no more than a syllogistic
assertion that the Constitution is more important than mere
statutes . . ...
- Why, he asks, should a document "'intended
to endure for ages to come'" 4 5 be "less circumscribed by the
meaning that its drafters seriously meant to give it than a

statute""6 that is "ephemeral." 47 And he further recalls Justice
Story's approach to "principled and defensible extrapolations
from the text by applying some definite and uniform technique
42. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAmS AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1972).

43. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 476. See also id. at 475. Compare Bridwell's statement in the text with the statement of Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, a prominent black social
scientist: "There are some problems in human relations that shouldn't be left to referendum . ..." N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1979, at 25, col. 1. In other words, the will of the people
does not count. Justice Stone cautioned against the danger that "the constitutional device
for the protection of minorities from oppressive majority action may be made the means
by which the majority is subjected to the tyranny of the minority." Quoted in A. MASON,
HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR

OF THE

LAW 331 (1956). Sleaking of Reynolds v. Sims, 377

U.S. 533 (1964), Alexander Bickel said, "Even the majority itself, the Court held, cannot
deprive itself of the right to rule as a majority." A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS 110 (1970).

44. Bridwell I,supra note 2, at 477 n.28.
45. Id. (quoting Alfange, On JudicialPolicymaking and ConstitutionalChange: Another Look at the "OriginalIntent" Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,5 HAsTNoS
CONST. L.Q. 603, 609 (1978)).
46. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 477 n.28.
47. Id. (quoting Alfange, On JudicialPolicymaking and ConstitutionalChange:Another Look at the "'OriginalIntent" Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,5 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 603, 609 (1978).
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of construction."48 Otherwise, as his friend Chancellor Kent
wrote, "the courts would be left to a dangerous discretion to

roam at large in the trackless field of their own imaginations." 4
And since Hamilton laid down in Federalist No. 78 that judges
"should be bound down by strict rules and precedents," where,
asks Professor Harry W. Jones, "were the American courts to
look to find them, other than in the corpus of English common
law doctrine,"5 which included the rules of documentary interpretation. To be sure, Jones also stated that "it was by no means
self-evident in 1789 that judges should use the same techniques
in the construction of constitutional provisions as in the interpretation of ordinary statutory and decisional sources." 51 But
he added, "[b]eing common lawyers to the core, early Justices
and judges simply took it for granted, as did the lawyers appearing before them, that the distinctive method of the common law,
the institution of precedent [and of rules of construction], was
to be used in carrying out the challenging new assignment." 5
Professors Edward Corwin and Julius Goebel found that the
founders early turned to the rules of statutory construction for
guidance to constitutional interpretation.5 3 The attempt to discredit this usage is a product of recent activist efforts to defend
judicial action in contravention of the framers' unmistakable
intention. No "hypertechnical" rules of construction are needed
to condemn this practice.
II.

SOME CONSTrrunoNAL HISTORY

In order to make this a self-contained article it is necessary
briefly to recapitulate some constitutional history. We are admonished by a number of early state constitutions, including the
John Adams Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, that "[a] frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the constitution . . . [is] absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of
48. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 468 n.1.
49. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 308 n.34. Story extolled the common law
because it "controls the arbitrary discretion of judges, and puts the case beyond the reach
of temporary feelings and prejudices." J. McCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTrruTION 98 (1971).

50. H. JONES, The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and American
Variations, in PoLmcAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CoNTmUrrY 91, 101-02 (H. Jones ed. 1976).

51. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 915 n.37 (quoting H. JONES, The Common Law in the
United States: English Themes, and American Variations, in POLICAL SEP'RTION AND

CoNTnurrY 134 (H. Jones ed. 1976)).
52. H. JONES, supra note 50, at 134.
53. 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 128 (1971);
Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARv. L.
REv. 149, 370-71 (1928). See also 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, §§ 400 n.2, 403 n.1 (M. Bigelow ed. 1905).
LEGAL
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liberty and to maintain a free government. .... The people...
have a right to require of their lawgivers and magistrates an exact
and constant observance of them."54 Among such "fundamental
principles" was that of a "fixed Constitution," arising from the
founders' dread of the "endlessly propulsive tendency [of power]
to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries" to the detriment
of liberty or right. 5 In the words of Professor Philip Kurland,
The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the
authority of government and its limits, that government is the
creature of the constitution and cannot do what it does not
authorize and must not do what it forbids. A priori, such a
constitution could have only a fixed and unchanging meaning,
if it were- to fulfill its function. For changed conditions, the
instrument itself made provision for amendment which, in accordance with the concept of a written constitution, was expected to be the only form of change ...
.

Another potent factor was the founders' "profound" fear of judicial discretion,5 7 forcefully expressed in 1767 by Chief Justice
Hutchinson of Massachusetts: "the Judge should never be the

Legislator: Because then the Will of the Judge would be the Law:
and this tends to a State of Slavery.""5 The 1780 Massachusetts

Constitution explicitly provided that the "judiciary should never
exercise legislative power so that this may be a government of
laws and not of men."59 Still another limiting factor was the fra54. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 287. Such provisions evidence what Willard
Hurst considers to be "a very basic principle of our constitutionalism ... a distrust of
official power." Quoted in id. at 287-88.

55.

B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION 56-57 (1967).

56. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978). For an early expression
to that effect see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 290-91. Robert Cover, a perfervid activist,
wrote that for the founders a constitution represented the will of the people "that would
determine explicit ... allocations of power and its corresponding limits." Quoted in id.,
supra note 1, at 252. One of the influential framers, Justice William Paterson, declared
that "[t]he Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people
and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it." Van Home v. Dorrance,
2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304, 308 (1795). See also note 33 supra. Justice Field declared for a
unanimous Court: "When once it is established that Congress possesses the power to pass
an act, our province ends with its construction. . . ." Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case).
57. G. WOOD, supra note 41, at 298. H. JONES, supra note 50, at 103 (also refers to
"the prevailing distrust of judicial discretion").,
58. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 307.
59. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXX, reprinted in 1 B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE
CONsTrrTrrIoNs AND COLONIAL CHARTERS 960 (1877).
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mers' rejection of judicial participation in legislative policymaking, because as Elbridge Gerry explained, "[ilt was quite foreign
from the nature of ye office to make them judges of the policy of
public measures .
."" This view was given powerful expres*.".
sion in an early, landmark assertion of the power of judicial review, Kamper v. Hawkins.61 Judge Henry stated,
The judiciary, from the nature of the office ... could never be
designed to determine upon the equity, necessity or usefulness
of a law; that would amount to an express interfering with the
legislative branch ... [N]ot being immediately chosen by the
60. Quoted in R. BaRana, supra note 1, at 301. Bridwell regards a "serious problem"
Berger's
reliance upon interpretations of American constitutional and legal history that
are actually inconsistent with his basic thesis. For example, Berger asserts that
"the Framers excluded the judiciary from policymaking. . . ." Yet he uncritically accepts a theory . . . that ... judges in the early nineteenth century
employed an "instrumental" style of decisionmaking pursuant to which they
consciously formulated policy.
Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 916-17 (footnotes omitted). Be it assumed, as Bridwell maintains, that non-instrumentalism prevailed in "private law activity in the federal courts"
during the early nineteenth century, that view, he states, "would strengthen Berger's case
for limitations on judicial power .... ." Id. at 918. Although his excursus on
"instrumentalism" is therefore gratuitous, because it does not change the result, it reveals
several analytical flaws. First, what judges did in the early 1800s cannot alter what the
framers said in 1787 when they excluded judicial participation in policymaking on the
Council of Revision. Second, instrumentalism took place in the frame of private-law cases
such as torts; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), did not reverse legislative policy, it held an act unconstitutional because it contravened an express constitutional provision. It is one thing to exercise the traditional policymaking power in torts that
the legislature could overrule, and another to overturn legislative policy, a departure from
the English practice not sanctioned by the early state cases.
Bridwell further charges me with inconsistency in pointing to "Story's opinion in
Swift v. Tyson as an example of impermissible lawmaking which the Court finally corrected in 1938." Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 917 (footnotes omitted). To show that the
passage of time does not legitimate a decision, I cited the fact that Swift was overruled
by Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 297 n.56.
Swift v. Tyson, 42 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), presents too complex an issue to dismiss
offhandedly as "an example of impermissible judicial lawmaking," Bridwell I, supra note
2, at 917, and nothing was further from my mind. This citation hardly supports the
conclusion that if "Story was acting incorrectly" we must question Berger's charges "that
the Warren Court was really acting in a novel or revolutionary manner by 'initiating
policy.'" Id. Still less tenable is Bridwell's statement that I have "failed to demonstrate
that the process employed by [the Warren Court] deviated from earlier conceptions of
judicial authority." Id. at 918. Even one sympathetic to the Warren Court, Professor
Archibald Cox, recognizes that "where the older activist decisions merely blocked legislative initiatives, the decisions of the 1950's and 1960's forced changes in the established
legal order." Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 428. The earlier Court, in a word, acted
as a nay-sayer, not as an initiator of policy. See id. at 305.
61. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
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people, nor being accountable to them, . . . they do not, and
ought not, to represent the people in framing or repealing any
law. 2

Such expressions, both before and after the adoption of the Constitution, testify to the limited scope of judicial review as conceived by the founders, 3 so that Hamilton was constrained to
assure the ratifiers that of the three departments, the "judiciary

was next to nothing."6 4 A little-noted cluster of Hamilton's pronouncements confirms the narrow scope of judicial review.65 Activists point to nothing in the history of the fourteenth amendment that indicates a departure from these views. To the contrary, the framers had a deep-seated distrust of the courts, kindled by the Fugitive Slave6 and Dred Scott 7 cases, that found
expression in the section 5 provision for enforcement of the
62. Id. at 47. Judge Tyler stated, "our constitution was made ... for ages to come,
subject only to such alterations as the people may please to make." Id. at 65. For similar
comments by an early commentator and distinguished lawyer, Peter Du Ponceau, see
Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 469-70 n.7.
None of the pre-1787 state cases encroached on legislative policymaking. See Berger,
"Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1979).
63. Bridwell observes that "some scholars have noted the incoherence of the debates
on judicial authority." Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 915-16. True it is that some-Judge
Learned Hand, Archibald Cox and Leonard Levy-regard the evidence that the framers
had judicial review in contemplation as inconclusive. For Cox and Levy, see R. BERGER,
supra note 1, at 355 & n.16; for Hand, see R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPEME CouRT 6
n.23 (1969). But that view undermines the legitimacy of judicial review altogether, for the
Constitution makes no specific provision for it. My own studies led me to conclude with
Edward Corwin that "on no other feature of the Constitution with reference to which there
has been any considerable debate is the view of the Convention itself better attested." Id.
at 105 (quoting E. CoRwiN, DOCTRINE OF JUDIcIAL REvIEw 12-13 (1941)). The dissenters were
very greatly outnumbered. R. BERGER, supra note 63, at 110. On the scope of judicial
review, I know of nothing that runs counter to Hamilton's assurances, see note 65 infra,
or to the convention's rejection of judicial participation in policymaking.
64. Quoted in THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) at 504 n.* (Mod. -Lib. ed. 1941).
65. These expressions include: (1) "The judiciary . . . can take no active resolution
whatever. It may be truly said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment,"
id. at 504, i.e., it cannot initiate policy; (2) there "is no liberty if the power of judging be
not separated from the legislative and executive powers," quoted in id. at 504 n.t; (3) the
courts may not "on the pretense of a repugnancy . . . substitute their or pleasure to
the constitutional intentions of the legislature," i.e., they may not intrude within the
boundaries of legislative power, id. at 507; (4) "[tlo avoid an arbitrary discretion in the
courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents
. ,," id. at 510; and (5) in No. 81, he assured the ratifiers that judges 'could be impeached for "deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature," id. No. 81 at 527.
66. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). See R. BERGER, supra note 1,
at 222.
67. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See R. BERGER, supra note

1, at 222.
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amendment by Congress, not the courts, as the Court emphasized in 1879.8 Instead the activists posit that the framers employed allegedly "general," "open-textured" terms69 in order to
overrule their unmistakable intention to exclude suffrage and
segregation from the scope of the amendment. That remarkable
claim is contradicted by the facts; it is part of the activist
scramble to rationalize decisions that realize their aspirations.
Ill.

THE TERMS ARE NOT "GENERAL"

A.

Due Process of Law

On the eve of the Constitutional Convention, in 1787, Hamilton stated that the words "due process" of law "are only applicable to . . . proceedings of the courts of justice," i.e., are
procedural, and "can never be referred to an act of the legislature,'" 0 i.e., are never substantive.He accurately summarized 400
years of English and colonial history. Charles Curtis, an ardent
proponent of judicial "adaptation" of the Constitution, stated
that when the founders put due process "into the Fifth Amendment, its meaning was as fixed and definite as the common law
could make a phrase . . . . It meant a procedural process
. . 'M"Professor John Hart Ely agrees; he located no reference
that gave the "identical" clause in the fourteenth "more than a
procedural connotation."" All the references to due process in the
39th Congress, and in subsequent Reconstruction Congresses, I
found, were in procedural terms, without the faintest suggestion
of a grant to the courts of power to displace congressional policy
or substantive decisions. 3 Instead, by section 5 the framers re68. See Ex ParteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). See also, R. BERGER, supra note 1, at
221.
69. Thus Professor Lawrence Tribe posits that "the Constitution is an intentionally
incomplete, often deliberately indeterminate structure for the participatory evolution of
political ideals and governmental practices," L. TRmE, AmFmCAN CONSTrrutONAL LAW iii
(1978); but Professor Michael Perry wonders "whose intentions and deliberations he is
referring to," Perry, supranote 2, at 695. For an extended comment on similar theorizing
by Ely, see Berger, Government by Judiciary:John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J.
277 (1978).
70. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 194.
71. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 200. See generally Berger, "Law of the
Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1979).
72. Berger, supra note 69, at 288 (quoting Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 416 (1978)).
73. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 193-214. See also Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REV.311, 334-35 (1979). An activist, Professor
Wallace Mendelson concluded that due process "long since became a term of art," that
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served power to enforce the amendment to Congress. Not until
the Court sought in the 1890's to save the nation from "socialism"
was due process given a "substantive" content," a practice now
admittedly discredited." In short, "due process of law" was not
a "general" word of uncertain meaning but had a fixed historical
content. Consequently, no authority to revise the Constitution or
to contravene the intention of the framers is to be found in the
words "due process of law."
B.

"Privilegesor Immunities"

"Privileges or Immunities," an activist critic of my views,
Professor Walter Murphy, stated, were "amply demonstrated" by
me to be "words of art." 6 Their history is not as incisively etched
as that of due process, but nevertheless it is distinctly traceable.
The term "privileges and immunities" had been employed in
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation where it was associated
with the "privileges of trade and commerce,"7 and was then incorporated in Article IV of the Constitution. Two "principal
spokesmen" and theorists of the Abolition movement, Lysander
Spooner and Joel Tiffany (who would therefore be likely to take
a broad view of the terms), stated that "privileges and immunities" meant that a citizen has a right "to full and ample protection in the enjoyment of his personal security, personal liberty,
and private property

. .

protection against oppression . . .

against lawless violence."" Earlier, the courts had stressed the
limited scope of the words in a number of cases,79 and when Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman of the Judiciary Committee and
sponsor of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 (which was then embodied
it meant in the fourteenth amendment what it meant in the fifthkand merely incorporated
"the traditional meaning," namely, "a fair hearing-nothing more." Mendelson, Raoul
Berger's Fourteenth-Abuse by Contractionvs. Abuse by Expansion, 6 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 437 (1979).
74. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at3, 269; R. McCLosKEY, THE AMEmcAN SUPRaME COURT
129-38 (1960); Linde, Due Process of Law Making, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 238 (1976).
75. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 258 n.39.
76. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1759. Murphy states "[t]hat some members of the 39th
Congress so stated he amply demonstrates." Id. He cites no evidence to the contrary, and
I found none. That the framers regarded the terms as having historical content is set forth
in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 20-51.
77. It afforded out.of-state citizens "all the privileges of trade and commerce." H.
COMMAGER, DOCUiENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (7th ed. 1963).
78. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 22.
79. See Berger, supra note 69, at 292-93.
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in and said to be "identical" with the fourteenth amendment),
explained the even broader terms of the bill, "civil rights and
immunities," he referred to those cases, saying that the "rights
of citizens" are the "great fundamental rights set forth in this
bill: the right to acquire property, the right to go and come at
pleasure, the right to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and dispose of property. These are the very
rights that are set forth in this bill,""0 as the text of the bill
corroborates.'
Bridwell contents himself with the comment that this clause
is viewed by "Berger as having a clear historically determined
content," and refers to "Ely's criticism of Berger's methods of
construing the amendment's history and determining the framers' intent." 2 Why are my historical "methods" unexceptionable with respect to the "exclusion" of suffrage and segregation
and suddenly vulnerable when I demonstrate that "privileges or
immunities" was not designed to override such exclusion? Moreover, where Bridwell finds the exclusion of suffrage "crystal
clear," 8 Ely obliquely differs, briskly dismissing "Berger's repeated assertion that given their racism the fourteenth amendment's framers could not conceivably have intended to draft a
provision capable one day of supporting the inference that blacks
were entitled to vote." 4 Ely relies on adoption of the fifteenth
amendment two years later to prove the contrary, 5 thereby casting doubt on his competency to evaluate the Reconstruction historical materials. For the fifteenth amendment does not testify to
the ebb of racism but to shifting political exigencies that made
the Negro vote important. Writing of the "fight for ratification"
of the fifteenth amendment, William Gillette stated, "public
opinion strongly opposed Negro rights, and the state legislators
who outraged this consensus would commit political suicide."8
80. Id. at 294 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866)).
81. See R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 24. That bill and amendment were deemed to be
"identical" is shown. Id. at 22-23. On this score there was no dissent.
82. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 477 n.28.
83. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 913.
84. Berger, supra note 69, at 282 (quoting Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 436 n.133 (1978)).
85. Berger, supra note 69 at 306-07 (citing Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 436 n.133 (1978)).
86. W. GiLLETE, supra note 21, at 80. See also id. at 25, 27, 32-33. It is generally
overlooked that ratification of the fourteenth amendment was made a condition of readmission to the Union, that in "June, 1868, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina,
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That amendment was motivated, said Gillette, by political,
rather than by humanitarian considerations, 7 as my own search
confirms."
There is no need to repeat the wealth of evidence on which
my view of the meaning of "privileges or immunities" is based,
or again to refute Ely.89 Let it suffice that Justice Field (and three
other justices, including Justice Bradley), upon whose dissent in
Slaughter-House Cases"0 Ely heavily relies, stated, and the record
bears Field out, that Corfield v. Coryel 1" "was cited by Senator
Trumbull with the observation that it enumerated the very rights
belonging to a citizen of the United States set forth in the 1st
section of the act .... -,2 And to repeat, it is uncontroverted that
Act and amendment were regarded by the framers as
"identical.""3 I suggest to Professor Bridwell that his reliance on
Ely is misplaced.
C.

Equal Protection of the Laws

The words "equal protection of the law" were new to constitutional phraseology, having no history comparable to that of due
process. These words, an activist, Professor Wallace Mendelson,
noted are so broad as to be almost meaningless. 4 Another activGeorgia, Louisiana, Alabama, and Florida were readmitted to the Union," and it was
these states "that made possible the ratification of the Fourteenth as well as the Fifteenth
Amendment." A. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDmENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 51
(1978). "Ratification of the Fifteenth as well as of the Fourteenth Amendment was made
a condition of readmission to the Union for Georgia, Texas, Virginia and Mississippi.
Without the required ratifications of these states, the Fifteenth Amendment would have
failed. . . ." Id. at 58. More bluntly stated, Northern opposition was circumvented by a
compulsory Southern vote. Presumably it was this that led Kenneth Stampp to write that
neither the fourteenth nor fifteenth amendments "could have been adopted under any
other circumstances, or at any other time, before or since .... " Id. at 55 (quoting
Stampp, The Tragic Legend of Reconstruction, in REcoNSTRUCTION: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
REVISIONIST WRITINGS 11-12 (K. Stampp and L. Litwack eds. 1968)).
87. W. GILLETTE, supra note 21, at 146. For Republican control of both North and
South, the Negro vote was now thought to be important. See Berger, supra note 69, at
307-08.
88. W. GILLETTE, supra note 21, at 146.
89. See note 69 supra.
90. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
91. 6 F. Cas. (No. 3230) 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
92. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 98. (Field, J., dissenting). See also Berger, supra note 69,
at 294.
93. Berger, supra note 69, at 295.
94. Mendelson, supra note 73, at 451.
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ist, Professor J.R. Pole, wrote: "The pursuit of equality was the
pursuit of an illusion, because equality was a complex concept
and not a simple or single goal."95 Given words of such uncertain
meaning, this is precisely the place to apply the advice of Senator
Charles Sumner to the 39th Congress: "If its meaning in any
place is open to doubt, or if words are used which seem to have
no fixed signification, we cannot err if we turn to the framers
...
" These views, we have good reason to believe, were shared
by his contemporaries. In 1872, "a unanimous Senate Judiciary
Report, signed by senators who had voted for the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in Congress,"9 7 declared:
In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it such
an interpretation as will secure the result which was intended
to be accomplished by those who framed it and the people who
adopted it ....
A construction which should give the phrase
...a meaning differing from the sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the
plain and express language of the Constitution in any other
particular."
For the framers, "equal protection" had a narrow meaning, being
associated throughout with the few rights set forth in the Civil
Rights Act. As said by Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio, "[iut secures. . . equality of protection in those enumerated civil rights
....
'
There were similar utterances by others.' The Civil
Rights Act and the amendment were in pari materia,dealing with
the same subject, and indeed being enacted at the same session
while proceeding on parallel tracks. Hence, the meaning given to
"equal protection" in the Act is to be given those words in the
amendment.' 1 Moreover, attempts to abolish all distinctions
95. Kurland, Book Review, 88 YALE L.J. 898, 901 (1979) (quoting J. PoLE, THE PURSur OF EQuALrrY n AMmcAN HISTORY

292 (1978)).

96. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 372.
97. Preface to A. AviNs, THE RECONSTRUCMON AMENDMENTS DEBATES at 2 (1967).
98. S. REP. No. 21, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1872), reprinted in A. AVINs, supra note
97, at 571.
99. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 169-70.
100. Leonard Myers of Pennsylvania said that the change "from slavery to freedom"
required that "each State shall provide for equality before the law, equal protection to
life, liberty and property, equal right to sue and be sued, to inherit, make contracts, and
give testimony," rights theretofore denied to Blacks and enumerated in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. A. Avrss, supra note 97, at 193.
101. Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162, 165 (1872).
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were repeatedly defeated,102 because, as the chairman of the Joint
Committee, Senator William Fessenden, explained, "[w]e cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing prejudices and
existing institutions, an entire exclusion of all class distinctions."'03
In sum, the foregoing demonstrates that "due process" and
"privileges or immunities" were words of fixed or ascertainable
meaning, and that "equal protection" was associated by the framers with narrow objectives, a better guide than a meaning so
broad as to be meaningless, and that conduces to unfettered discretion.
IV.

THE OPEN-ENDED THEORY

The "open-ended" theory, fathered by Alexander Bickel, is
a variant of the "general" terms theory; as restated by Bridwell,
the terms of the fourteenth amendment allegedly "provided a
legitimate vehicle for change by the Court in later times." ' 4 This
theory, Bridwell notes, "found favor with the Court and commentators," amounting "to a powerful school of apologists," few of
whom "escape Berger's barbs."'0 5 From this one might deduce
that Bridwell is sympathetic to the theory, but in fact, he is
ambivalent. Commenting on Ely's version of the "open-ended"
theory-an "invitation to import into the constitutional decision
process considerations that will not be found in the amendment
nor even . . . elsewhere in the Constitution" 0 °5 -Bridwell

re-

marks that Ely "seems to proceed from an impression from a
facial evaluation of the document about the vagueness or 'opentextured' quality of particular constitutional amendments.

. .

to

relate his own plausible but personal reaction to the language of
the Constitution."'0 7 The historical demonstration that the terms
of the amendment were not "general" renders Ely's "personal
R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 163-64.
Quoted in id. at 99.
Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 911.
Id. at 912 n.31. One of those "apologists," Alfred Kelly, tacitly recanted. R.
BERGER, supra note 1, at 242. An eminent British political scientist, Professor Max Beloff
commented on this "powerful school": "The quite extraordinary contortions that have
gone into proving the contrary [to my view] make sad reading for those impressed by
the high quality of American legal-historical scholarship." Beloff, supra note 22, at H.
106. Berger, supra note 69, at 277 (quoting Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 hNo. L.J. 399, 415 (1978)).
107. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 481-82 n.42.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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reaction" implausible. For men do not employ words to defeat
their purpose; and it is this that led Justice Holmes to hold that
"it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: 'We see
what you are driving at, but you have not said it.' "105
Since activists regard the "open-textured" terms as supporting "whatever interpretation the judiciary makes of them"1'-a
charter for untethered judicial discretion"-I may be indulged
for summarizing the materials considered by Professor Michael
Perry to constitute a "devastating" refutation."' As Justice
Frankfurter's clerk, Bickel's research led him to write, "[i]t is
impossible to conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible also to conclude that they
foresaw it might be, under the language they were adopting.""'
But when he revised his memorandum for publication after his
mentor's participation in the desegregation decision he asked,
"[w]hat if any thought was given to the long range effect of the
amendment in the future?" And he ventured the tentative hypothesis: could resort to "equal protection of the laws" "have
failed to leave the implication that the new phrase, while it did
not necessarily, and certainly not expressly, carry greater coverage than the old, was nevertheless roomier, more receptive to the
'latitudinarian' construction?""' "It remains true," he wrote,
"that an explicit provision going further than the Civil Rights Act
would not have carried in the 39th Congress.""' And he noted
that the Republicans drew back from a "formulation dangerously5
vulnerable to attacks pandering to the prejudice of the people.""
But, he speculated, "may it not be that the Moderates and Radi-

108. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 369 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30,
32 (1st Cir. 1908)).
109. Bridwell II,supra note 2, at 477.
110. Ely is uneasy about "untethered standards." See Berger, supra note 69, at 27879.
111. See text accompanying note 158 infra.
112. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 100 (emphasis added).
113. Quoted in id. at 101-02. While Bickel noted that the "new phrase" originally had
two parts: "the same political rights and privileges and . . . equal protection in the
enjoyment of life, liberty, and property," Bickel, The Original Understandingand the
SegregationDecision, 69 HARv.L. REv. 1, 31 (1955) (emphasis added), he overlooked that
this conjunction attested that "political," and a fortiori unmentioned, rights, were not
contained in "equal protection." When the "political rights" phrase was deleted, the
deletion blocked a "roomier, more. .. 'latitudinarian' construction" that would compre.hend what had been excluded.
at 104.
114. Quoted in R. BaGER, supra note 1-,
115. Quoted in id.
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cals reached a compromise permitting them to go to the country
with language which they could, where necessary, defend against
damaging alarms raised by the opposition but which at the same
time was sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future advances?""' Baldly stated, Bickel's hypothesis is that the alleged
compromisors concealed the future objectives they dared not
avow lest the whole enterprise be imperiled. And failing disclosure there could be no ratification." 7 These facts also cut the
ground from under Ely's "invitation" analysis.
Nevertheless Bridwell regards Ely's observations as suggesting "some accommodation of practical limitations on judicial
decisional techniques in constitutional law on the one hand, and
our philosophical preferences on the other," ' 8 quoting Ely:
If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended provisions cannot be developed, one that is
not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to
representative democracy, responsible commentators would
have to conclude, whatever the framers may have been assuming, that the courts should stay away from them.'
According to Bridwell, Ely "rejects unfettered judicial discretion
to formulate antimajoritarian principles out of some prevalent
judicial philosophy .
."I" Yet his "invitation" theory prem*.".
ises that the framers invested the judiciary with precisely such
discretion. But this "invitation" is so "frightening"'' that Ely
proposes to develop limiting principles. What frightens him at the
distance of 100 years must even more have deterred the framers,
acutely distrustful of the courts,' 22 and little minded to invite
them to override their determination to exclude suffrage and segregation.In

116. Quoted in id.
117. Id. at 155 n.93.
118. Bridwell I1, supra note 2, at 482.
119. Id. at 482-83 (quoting Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and
Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 448 (1978)).
120. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 475 n.21. Cf. id. at 468 n.3.
121. Ely observes that "[tihe invitation apparently extended by the clause is frightening." Id. at 477 n.28 (quoting Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and
Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 425 (1978)).
122. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 222; Berger, supra note 73, at 350-51.
123. "Judicial abolition of segregation under the banner of the fourteenth amendment" cannot therefore "be explained by way of determinist philosophy as the continued
unfolding of events compatible with the previously stated-though imperfect and incom-
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The "real question" therefore is not as Bridwell phrases it,
"whether or not this 'principled' approach can be developed," but
whether (1) the framers conferred such "frightening" unfettered
discretion on the courts, and (2) if they did, how influential can
limiting "principles" developed by academe be when the Court
feels free to disregard even the unmistakable intention of the
framers.
An "important consideration," Bridwell tells us, is "the significance of changes in the meaning of words or phrases .... ","I
Although he indicates that the "problems of constitutional interpretation" are not soluble "by a purely semantic analysis," he
also remarks, "[i]t is certainly possible that the framers' intent
was in fact compatible with these semantic insights and recognized the need for evolving applications of the language of the
Constitution." 125 have no problem with "application of the principle to other, different fact situations"; 21 for me the question is
whether the principle itself can be changed because the words
employed by the framers to express their intention have
changed. ' For example, it would be "improper," said Paul Brest,
an ardent activist, to construe a term such as "bi-weekly," which
in 1787 meant "only 'once every two weeks,'" to mean "semiweekly," because it has come to mean "twice a week" in our
plete-attempts to promote some general objective." Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 478. For
no "general" objective can overcome the specific, unmistakable will of the framers to
exclude segregation. It is not clear to me that Bridwell shares this "determinist philosophy," but he neglects to assess my demonstration that the express intention to exclude
suffrage and segregation was not overridden by the allegedly "general," "open-ended"
terms.
He correctly remarks that "[tihe alleged ongoing power to judicially revise previous
majoritarian expression in light of current ones [busing] seems inconsistent with identifying the Constitution as a source of constitutional protection for minorities." Id. at 475.
And he justly observes, those earlier affirmations must "to some extent [be] immune
from overt judicial revision if the protection is to be meaningful, lest today's perceived
majority bent on discrimination find support in a court willing to overlook express constitutional guarantees created in the past. The dead hand of Earl Warren may be as easily
thrust aside as that of Rufus Peckham." Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
124. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 916.
125. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 478 n.28 (emphasis added).
126. Bridwell I, supra note 2, at 914 n.36.
127. Bridwell taxes me with "failing to distinguish between principles contained in
the Constitution and examples of contemporary understanding as to the application of
those principles as evidence of the intention of the framers. . . ." Id. When the framers
excluded suffrage and segregation they limited the "principle" of "equal protection"; it
could not be "applied" thereto. A "principle" may be explicitly limited, or by the unmistakable intention of the framers that it be so limited.
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time.'28 Adherents of the "change of meaning" would endow the
Court with power to revise the Constitution by pouring its own
new "meaning" into its terms, as it did in creating the doctrine
of substantive due process in defiance of its well-established procedural meaning. A generation attached to a "fixed" Constitution, and in Jefferson's words, intent on binding down their delegates "from mischief by the chains of the Constitution,' 2 was
little likely to entertain a "semantic" theory that would dissolve
those chains. Before the dawn of "semaitics," Madison wrote,
"[w]hat a metamorphosis would be produced in the code of the
law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modern
sense." 130 And he insisted that if "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation. . .be not the guide
in expounding it, there can be no security . . .for a faithful

exercise of its powers."' 13' Jefferson was of the same mind.'3 2 No
contrary expression in the contemporary literature came to my
attention, and activists have cited none. The view that constitutional interpretation can turn on changed meaning of words was
rejected by a unanimous Senate Judiciary Report in 1872, signed
by senators who had voted for the fourteenth amendment: "A
change in the popular use of any word employed in the Constitution cannot retroact upon the Constitution, either to enlarge or
limit its provisions."' 3 On the contrary view, popular usage, oblivious to constitutional implications, would unwittingly amend
the Constitution in spite of the formal procedure required by
Article V. Justice Holmes declared that "the purpose of written
instruments is to express some intention or state of mind of those
who write them, and it is desirable to make that purpose effective."' 3 Even Humpty Dumpty claimed no more than to give the
words he used such meaning as he chose. Learned discourse about
the "meaning of meaning"' ' 3 beclouds the issue: may the Court
displace the framers' choices by changing the meaning of the
terms they used to express them.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Quoted in R. BEaG, supra note 1, at 370-71 n.38.
Quoted in id. at 252.
Quoted in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 33, at 464.
Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 366.
S. REP.No. 21, supra note 98, at 3, reprintedin A. Avws, supra note 97, at 572.
0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 206 (1920).
See R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 369.
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V.

COMPETING PmLOSOPmES?

Bridwell's translation of the problem-and he is not alone in

this-into one of opposing philosophical theories with which he
would have us grapple" ' darkens counsel. Willard Hurst pierced
to the heart of the matter in 1954: "the real issue is who is to make
the policy choices in the twentieth century: judges or the combination of legislature and electorate that makes constitutional
amendments."'' 7 Where was the Court authorized to supplant the
value choices of the framers (e.g., suffrage) with its own?
To be sure, one may have "philosophical preferences for
limited government,"' 38 or may prefer, as anarchists do, no
government at all, or a judicial oligarchy to an elective democratic system based on majoritarian rule. It is open to academe
"philosophically" to reject a system, as does Sanford Levinson,
that enables a majority to "tyrannize" over a minority,' 9 or, as
does Arthur S. Miller, to refuse to be governed by the dead hand
of the past.'40 But we are not writing on a clean slate, free to make
such choices ab initio. They were made by the founders and ratified by the people.' It is not for academicians to repudiate those
choices; only the people may do so by the machinery for amendment Article V provides. Given that suffrage was unmistakably
excluded from the scope of the fourteenth amendment, it is not
a matter of philosophical choice to endow the Court with power
to overturn that determination.' The Court is a creature of the
Constitution and has only such power as it confers,"' and it lies
beyond the power of academe to confer more.
The "primary question," unless we speak in terms of an
amendment, is therefore not as Professor Michael Perry suggests,
"What sort of 'democratic' society do we want? What sort of
relationship should exist between the processes of majoritarian
136. See Bridwell H, supra note 2, at 472, 483.
137. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 315.
138. Bridwell 11, supra note 2, at 482.
139. Berger, The Constitutionand the Rule of Law, 1 W. NEW ENGLAND L. Rav. 261
(1978).
140. Miller, supra note 1.
141. See Berger, supra note 69, at 281.
142. Justice Harlan stated, "[w]hen, in the name of constitutional interpretation,
the Court adds something to the Constitution that was deliberately excluded from it, the
Court in reality substitutes its view of what should be so for the amending process."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1964).
143. "Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power not derived from
the Constitution." Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
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policymaking and the judiciary ....
144 Of course, "the precise
character of our societal commitment is [not] an immutable
given ...

."I" What is at issue, however, is whether that com-

mitment can be changed by the Court rather than the people. My
let me add, has no tinge of
attachment to the Constitution,
"religious reverence";148 I am committed to it because it is the
"voice of the people" and, as in the case of suffrage, incontrovertibly expressed their sentiments. My credo is that of Charles
McIlwain: "The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the
legal limits of arbitrary power and a complete responsibility of
the government to the governed.""14 That credo led me to condemn the excesses of Richard Nixon, and I cannot condone those
of Earl Warren because their purpose was benign. 4 '
"Constitutionalism" is therefore more than a strand of "political
philosophy";'" it epitomizes adherence to the "fixed" Constitution adopted by the people, setting up a government on majoritarian principles and carefully limiting the power they delegated.
Secretary Harris, be it noted, does not repudiate the Constitution; she appeals to it for vindication of virtually unlimited minority rights.'50
The opposing positions are thus summarized by Bridwell:
Does the Constitution guarantee to us the supposed benefits
flowing from unlimited experimentation by some supreme policymaking arm of the central government .

.

. or contrawise,

does it protect us from exactly this form of experiment by insuring a permanent severance of legislative, discretionary policy
formulation on the one hand and judicial authority on the
other."' ,
144. Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role

in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1214 (1978) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
145. Id.
146. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 481. It was because they were bulwarks against
oppression that, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "written constitutions have been

viewed with so much reverence." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
147. C. MCILWAIN, CONsTrrurzoNALISM: ANcmiET AND MODEM 146 (rev. ed. 1947).
148. Leonard Levy observed, "result-oriented jurisprudence. . . [is a] judicial monstrosity that gains nothing when the Court reaches a just result merely because of its
identification with underdog litigants." Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 343.

149. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 469 n.4.
150. Harris, Address to the Fellows of the American BarFoundation,30 S.C.L. REv.
485 passim (1979).
151. Bridwell II, supra note 2, at 482.
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The clear answer given by constitutional history is that the judiciary was separated from the legislative and excluded from policymaking. The "realist" touchstone noted by Bridwell is whether
"we gain or lose from the policy initiatives of a 'frankly experimental' judiciary." 5 2 Judicial power cannot be enlarged by invoking cost-benefit considerations which the Court itself is to weigh
and thus confer power on itself to set the framers' choices aside.
Nor is it to be doubted that the framers had no stomach for a
"frankly experimental judiciary" and, as Justice Iredell, James
Bradley Thayer and Judge Learned Hand declared, limited its
role to policing constitutional boundaries,1 3 as Chief Justice Marshall exemplified in Marbury v. Madison.'54
Because this issue of the scope of judicial power is basic to
constitutional law, it will profit us to examine it further in the
frame of Professor Michael Perry's parallel exposition. As opposed to those who cling to the constitutional text and its history,
Perry observes that the "functionalist" test is whether the expanded judicial role is "salutary."' 5 "Properly refined," he
writes, "the question is whether majoritarian policymaking shall
be restrained not only by the constitutional text, but also by the
Court's countervailing policymaking."' 5 The functionalists, he
notes, claim that "the Framers intentionally committed the
American constitutional system to a degree of judicial policymaking," relying in particular on the employment of Bickel's "openended" terms "so that posterity might in effect rewrite the document to accommodate ever-arising and ever-new exigencies."' 5
Despite his continuing attachment to expansive judicial review,
on grounds hereinafter considered, Perry has since written that
Berger has "devastated the notion that the framers of the fourteenth amendment-a major aspect of the constitutional
text-intended it to be 'open-ended.'""
And he considers that
152. Id.
153. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 249-50 & n.3, 305 & n.26. Justice Iredell stated,
"[t]he power of the legislatures is limited" by the several constitutions. "Beyond [those]
limitations. . . their acts are void, because they are not warranted by the authority given.
But within them . . . the Legislatures only exercise a discretion expressly confided to
them by the constitution." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 266 (1796) (emphasis
added).
154. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
155. Perry, supra note 144, at 1205.
156. Id. at 1213.
157. Id. at 1211. See note 69 supra.
158. Perry, supra note 2, at 695.
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"[tihe judicial practice of striking down governmental action on
the basis of expansive 'modem' readings of the constitutional text
. . . finds no warrant in the known intentions of the Founding

Fathers.""' This leaves us with what Perry states is "[t]he truly
fundamental problem posed by expansive [judicial] review, and
by substantive due process in particular, ... that of
0 where is the judiciary authorized to displace majorauthority":'"
itarian policymaking?
Perry proffers an answer. While recognizing the founders'
restrictive view of judicial review, Perry observes: "In time, however, judicial review came to serve other, more complex functions
16 It did not do so, however, by virtue
in American government.""
of a fresh constitutional grant, but by a series of arrogations.
Perry himself rejects the argument that "over time the people
have consented to and thereby legitimized expansive judicial review . .

. What one person interprets as consent, particularly

when that consent is silent, another may see as forbearance or
simply lethargy." ' 2 Worse, approval by silence circumvents the
Article V provision for amendment, supplanting it by amendment by inertia-and in the absence of disclosure that the Court
is exercising powers not granted.'63 There can be no ratification
where there is no disclosure. It needs no more than Hamilton's
statement to collapse the argument: "Until the people have, by
some solemn and authoritative act annulled or changed the established form, it is binding

. . .

and no presumption, or even

knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives
in a departure from it, prior to such an act.""' Hamilton also
159. Perry, supra note 144, at 1212. See note 65 supra.
160. Perry, supra note 144, at 1231 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 1215.
162. Id. at 1212-13. For example, "[c]ongressional inaction cannot always, or
usually, be deemed consent" to presidential action. L. HEN~iN, FOREIGN AFFARs AND THE
CONsTrrurTON 102 (1972).
163. I therefore dissent from Bridwell's allusion to "the historical fact of popular
approval of judicial action." Bridwell I,supra note 2, at 908 n.3. Nor would I rest on a
"theory of consent" in terms of "social contract" or on any other theory, but rather would
more simply say, as did James Iredell, one of the foremost founders: "The people have

chosen to be governed under such and such principles. They have not chosen to be governed or promised to submit upon any other." Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 295-

96. Bridwell adverts to "the almost universally accepted importance of consent as a
prerequisite to valid and binding rules of constitutional (or other) laws-because of the
primacy of democratic theory in our constitutional scheme." Bridwell II, supra note 2, at

468 n.1. This is a good enough guide to steer by.
164. Quoted in R. BEROE, supra note 1, at 316. Another framer, Elbridge Gerry, als6
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undercuts the other branch of Perry's argument, that "in time"
"another function [the ethical function] . . . was to give voice
to, even to shape, the professed widely-shared ideals and sensibilities of society.""16 At no time was such power conferred by the
people. The desegregation decision was hardly a response to the
"widely shared ideals" of society; in fact, the Court shrank from
telling the people, as Justice Jackson urged, that we are making
"new law for a new day."'65 The realities were more clearly perceived by Professor Archibald Cox. By the 1950s, he wrote, the
legislative process
[had become] resistant to libertarian, humanitarian, and egalitarian impulses . .. [I]n the new era these impulses were not
shared so strongly and widely as to realize themselves through
legislation. They came to be felt after the early 1950s by a majority of the Supreme Court Justices, perhaps by the fate which put
one man upon the Court rather than another [a Warren for a
Vinson], perhaps because the impulses7 were more strongly felt
in the world of the highly educated,
who at last carried the day. The persistent, widespread resistance
to busing further testifies that the Court is not even now realizing
"widely shared ideals." And though Ely shares Perry's activism,
he convincingly demonstrates that judges are not "best equipped
to make moral judgments," that in a search for "social ideals"
regarded the amendment process as exclusive. See id. at 317-18. See also T.I.M.E. v.
United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
Activists protest that the amendment process is "cumbersome," R. BERGER, supra
note 1, at 315-16, as if that serves as an unwritten dispensation to disregard what the Court
itself has indicated is the sole machinery for change, Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227
(1920). As Bridwell observes, the "cumbersome" argument cuts both ways: it is an
"equally good argument against unrestrained judicial rule-making at the constitutional
level because we will be hard pressed to gain relief from their decisions." Bridwell H, supra
note 2, at 472 n.12. In other words, if it is too "cumbersome" to ask the people to alter
constitutional provisions, it is too "cumbersome" to require reversal of judicial usurpation
by amendment to restore the will of the people.
165. Perry, supra note 144, at 1216.
166. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 130. Cf. note 27 supra.
167. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 313. This is euphemistically described by
Secretary Harris as "[tihe fact that major social conflicts can be resolved by the legal
process is a crucial accomplishment for this nation." Harris, supra note 150, at 492. They
are not "resolved," but remain a subject of public controversy, e.g., busing. See note 27
supra. Professor Joseph W. Bishop wrote: "Those who favor abortion, busing ... have
no faith whatever in the wisdom or will of the great majority of the people, who are
opposed to them. They are doing everything possible to have those problems resolved by
a small minority in the courts . . . ." Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 314 n.6.
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what the judge is "really. . . discovering. . . are his own val1 8
ues. ,
In focusing on the central question of authority, Perry goes
to the heart of the debate. But his answer does not root judicial
authority to divine "social ideals" in either the constitutional text
or its history. As Judge Learned Hand said, the judge "has no
right to divinations of public opinion which run counter to its last
formal expressions." 6 ' That the Founders did not authorize the
judiciary to act as soothsayers who would divine the "social ideals" of their generation and set aside the peoples' "last formal
expression" is attested by thdir rejection of judicial participation
in policymaking, by their profound distrust of judicial discretion,
and by their express provision for amendment 'by the people, a
process Elbridge Gerry and Alexander Hamilton declared to be
exclusive.
If one accepts the Constitution it is hardly arguable
"philosophically" that the Court may change an explicit textual
provision, e.g., change the two-year term in the House of Representatives into a four-year term. No more may it amend the clear
intention to exclude suffrage, for under age-old canons of construction the clear intention is as good as written into the text, 10
and is equally to be honored. At least as regards the unmistakable
intention to exclude suffrage and segregation, the issue is not one
of "philosophical" choices but one of power: where was the Court
empowered to override that intention?
Finally, because the "New Faith" of the activists has taken
on an air of immutable dogma, I would recall to them the words
of the Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Fuller in 1892:
[W]e can perceive no reason for holding that the power confided to the States by the Constitution has ceased to exist because the operation of the system has not fully realized the
hopes of those by whom it was created. Still less can we recognize the doctrine, that because the Constitution has been found
in the march of time sufficiently comprehensive to be applicable
to conditions not within the minds of its framers, and not arising
168. Berger, supra note 69, at 311-12 (quoting Ely, Foreward:On DiscoveringFundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5, 16 (1978)).
169. L. H D, THE SPIRMT OF LmERTY 14 (1952).

170. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30,
32 (lst Cir. 1908) (Holmes, J.). See text accompanying note 108 supra (quoting Holmes'
opinion in Johnson).
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in their time, it may therefore be wrenched from the subjects
expressly embraced within it, and amended by judicial decision
without action by the designated organs in the mode by which
alone amendments can be made."'
In terms of the current debate, it is one thing to apply amorphous
terms to conditions not foreseen by the framers and something
else again judicially to change a principle, e.g., "equal protection," plainly limited by the framers, without the sanction of an
amendment. Powers reserved to the states are not obliterated
because they have not been exercised to satisfy current aspirations.
171. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892).
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